Economics
- ISSN: 2155-7950
- Journal of Business and Economics
Fuzzy Acquisition Boundaries: A Success Model of Regulatory
Stakeholder Interests
Terry R. Adler1, Thomas G. Pittz2
(1. New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM 88003-8001, USA;
2. East Carolina University, Greenville, NC 27858, USA)
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to describe how powerful regulatory stakeholder interests succeed in a business relationship due to what we refer to as “fuzzy acquisition boundaries”. In the case described in this article, the city of Seattle, Washington lost their National Basketball Association (NBA) championship team, the Seattle Supersonics, due to combination of legitimate strategic deception, legal disputation power and low minority stakeholder salience by the city of Seattle. We postulate that these three conditions as well as a close relationship with NBA leadership provided the framework that enabled Oklahoma City People’s Basketball Club to sever the tenuous but valued partnership between the city of Seattle and the Supersonics. While secondary source data is used as a basis for this case, we apply a stakeholder, institutional and transaction cost theoretical lens to provide insights for understanding how and why this NBA team was acquired and moved. Relevant literature and practical applications to strategic research are also discussed.
Key words: stakeholder success; strategic deception; acquisition and firm boundaries
JEL codes: L2, L5, Z2