Pedro Letai

(IE University, Madrid 28006, Spain)

 

 

Abstract: Copyright systems all over the world are modeled on the one-size-fits-all principle. However important or unimportant, original works of authorship receive the same scope of protection. The equality principle gives all creators access to the same remedies, even when those remedies create perverse incentives. Moreover, society overpays for innovation by inflicting on society more monopoly losses than are strictly necessary to incentivize production. The paper proposes a solution for these problems in the form of a self-tailored system of copyright. The self-tailored system would allow creators to self-select the optimal protection for their intellectual works. This self-tailored system would encourage wider dissemination and more extensive use of expressive works under a lower social cost, granting monopoly protection to intellectual goods while at the same time, maintaining an adequate level of economic incentives to create. Moreover, under the proposed model, highly original works will receive enhanced protection and, conversely, authors of less original works will receive diminished protection and incur greater exposure to copyright liability. The proposal works by designing separate rules for highly original works, for works exhibiting average originality, and for works that are minimally original or unoriginal.

 

 

Key words: law & economics; intellectual property; copyright law

 

JEL code: K39